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Senior Editor: Bruce HardieMost event studies rely on cumulative abnormal returns, measured as percentage changes in
stock prices, as their dependent variable. Stock price reﬂects the value of the operating busi-
ness plus non-operating assets minus debt. Yet, many events, in particular in marketing, only
inﬂuence the value of the operating business, but not non-operating assets and debt. For
these cases, the authors argue that the cumulative abnormal return on the operating business,
deﬁned as the ratio between the cumulative abnormal return on stock price and the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc leverage effect, is a more appropriate dependent variable. Ignoring the differences in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc leverage effects inﬂates the impact of observations pertaining to ﬁrms with
large debt and deﬂates those pertaining to ﬁrms with large non-operating assets. Observations
of ﬁrms with high debt receive several times the weight attributed to ﬁrms with low debt. A
simulation study and the reanalysis of three previously published marketing event studies
shows that ignoring the ﬁrm-speciﬁc leverage effects inﬂuences an event study's results in
unpredictable ways.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Keywords:
Event study
Cumulative abnormal return
Leverage effect
Shareholder value
Stock market
Marketing-ﬁnance interface
Financial structure1. Introduction
Event studies, originally pioneered in accounting and ﬁnance (for a review, see Corrado, 2011), are a popular method for
assessing the valuation that ﬁnancial markets attribute to marketing-related events (Johnston, 2007; Sorescu, Warren, & Ertekin,
2017). This method is based on the idea that the stock price reﬂects the true value of a ﬁrm (i.e., all discounted future cash
ﬂows) because it incorporates all relevant information. Accordingly, assuming that ﬁnancial markets are efﬁcient, i.e., that the
ﬁnancial value of new information is rapidly assimilated into stock prices, the value of an unanticipated event can be determined
on the basis of subsequent stock price changes (Fama, 1970, 1991).
An event study entails collecting a sample of observations of one event type and then, in most cases, carrying out the following
two steps: First, for each observation, the method estimates the cumulative abnormal percentage change in the stock price over a
given time period around the event. We call this change the cumulative abnormal percentage return on shareholder value (CARSHV).
We use the term “shareholder value” to refer to a ﬁrm's market capitalization, which is equal to the share price multiplied by the
number of shares outstanding. Second, to identify determinants of this change, a regression is carried out in which CARSHV is the
dependent variable and characteristics of the ﬁrm or the event serve as independent variables.yer@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de (E. Bayer), lschoeler@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de (L. Schöler).
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642 B. Skiera et al. / International Journal of Research in Marketing 34 (2017) 641–659Most marketing event studies analyze the ﬁnancial value of marketing-related events, such as (cobranded) new product
(pre)announcements (e.g., Bornemann, Schöler, & Homburg, 2015; Cao & Sorescu, 2013), brand value announcements
(Dutordoir, Verbeeten, & De Beijer, 2015), innovation-related announcements (e.g., Borah & Tellis, 2014; Sood & Tellis, 2009),
CMO successions (Wang, Saboo, & Grewal, 2015), product recalls (Hsu & Lawrence, 2016), company name changes (Horsky &
Swyngedouw, 1987), announcements of alliances (Mani & Luo, 2015; Swaminathan & Moorman, 2009), decisions to outsource
customer support (Raassens, Wuyts, & Geyskens, 2014), or customer satisfaction announcements (Ivanov, Joseph, & Wintoki,
2013). These events inﬂuence the value of a ﬁrm's operating assets, which constitute the operating business (Damodaran,
2006). In particular, we know that marketing events impact a ﬁrm's intangible assets, a speciﬁc type of operating assets (for re-
view see Srinivasan & Hanssens, 2009). Changes in the value of the operating business then impact shareholder value.
However, a ﬁrm's value to its shareholders depends upon its operating business as well as its ﬁnancial structure, i.e., its quan-
tities of non-operating assets and debt, which can be substantial (Schulze, Skiera, & Wiesel, 2012). Some ﬁrms have high quantities
of non-operating assets such as cash and marketable securities — e.g., Apple and Microsoft had cash reserves of about $216 and
$103 billion at the end of 2015 — and these assets have a positive inﬂuence on shareholder value (Damodaran, 2006). Other
ﬁrms issue corporate bonds and have signiﬁcant bank debt, which negatively inﬂuences shareholder value.
We suggest that, in attempting to assess the value of a marketing-related event, it is necessary to carefully examine whether
the event is expected to inﬂuence (i) all value components of a ﬁrm's value, which are the value a ﬁrm's operating business, its
non-operating assets and its debt, or (ii) only the operating business. Speciﬁcally, we propose that if the event only inﬂuences
the value of the operating business, then the CARSHV variable, which captures all aspects of a ﬁrm's value, may not be the appro-
priate dependent variable. In this case, we recommend the use of the cumulative abnormal percentage return on the value of the
operating business (CAROB) instead of CARSHV. CAROB can easily be calculated as the ratio between CARSHV and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc le-
verage effect. The latter relates the value of a ﬁrm's operating business (i.e., shareholder value minus non-operating assets plus
debt) to its shareholder value and is a metric to capture the ﬁnancial structure of the ﬁrm (Schulze et al., 2012).
Literature and practitioners suggest that most marketing-related events only inﬂuence the value of the operating business, but
not non-operating assets and debt. In particular, our interdisciplinary literature review reveals just three marketing-related events
where an impact on non-operating assets and debt could be possible. Our in-depth interviews with a senior analyst and an invest-
ment fund manager, suggest that in practice even the rather drastic marketing events revealed by the literature review would only
lead to a re-evaluation of the value of the ﬁrm's operating business. Nevertheless, we argue that the more likely an event impacts
the ﬁrm's risk structure or ﬁnancial needs above and beyond its working capital, the more researchers should consider an impact
of the event on non-operating assets and debt as well. The reason is that for these kinds of events, at least theoretically, we cannot
exclude an impact on debt (e.g., through impact on ﬁrm's credit rating) or non-operating assets (e.g., alternative use of excess cash
with different return) ex ante.
We show that results obtained in cross-sectional studies using CAROB instead of CARSHV are likely to differ because heteroge-
neity in the ﬁrms' ﬁnancial structures inﬂates the impact of observations pertaining to ﬁrms with large debt and deﬂates those
pertaining to ﬁrms with large non-operating assets. Such biases can inﬂuence a study's conclusions regarding the size of the im-
pact of a marketing-related event and, even worse, can provide misleading evidence regarding the sign of the impact: value-cre-
ating events can easily be classiﬁed as value-destroying events and vice versa.
Thus, the aim of this paper is to encourage researchers to consider their choices of dependent variables carefully and to use
CAROB where appropriate, instead of CARSHV, or to report results for both dependent variables and then argue which one is
most suitable for the problem at hand. Stated differently, we feel that the choice of the dependent variable in marketing-related
event studies warrants much more discussion than it currently receives.
In the following, we brieﬂy describe the event study methodology, and provide an overview of how previous research has con-
sidered the ﬁnancial structure in marketing-related event studies. Then, we show in our conceptual framework how the event
type should affect the choice of the dependent variable, and how to derive CAROB from the ﬁrm-speciﬁc leverage effect and
from CARSHV. Next, we provide a numerical example to illustrate why models using CARSHV as the dependent variable yield differ-
ent results than models using CAROB as the dependent variable. In a subsequent simulation study, we further explore the devia-
tions between CAROB and CARSHV and analyze the conditions under which they are particularly strongly dispersed. Finally, we
reanalyze three previously published marketing event studies and compare the published results with the results that emerge
when choosing CAROB instead of CARSHV as a dependent variable. We end with a summary and conclusion.
2. Current practice in event studies
2.1. Description of event study methodology
An event study usually consists of two steps (for a detailed description of the event study methodology, see for example
McWilliams & Siegel, 1997, Sorescu et al., 2017). For the purpose of simplicity, we describe them as consecutive steps, although
they might be carried out simultaneously.
In the ﬁrst step, the event study calculates the percentage change in the stock price of each ﬁrm-instance observation2 due to
the arrival of new information (i.e., the event). The standard approach calculates the percentage change in a ﬁrm's share price, and2 Note that event studies usually usemultiple observations per ﬁrm, i.e., a ﬁrm features several events of the same type at different time points. Therefore, we use the
term ﬁrm-instance observation to unambiguously identify each observation in the sample.
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share price minus the expected rate of return on the share price, frequently measured by using Fama and French's factors. Signif-
icant differences between a ﬁrm's actual rate of return and the expected rate of return reﬂect abnormal returns caused by the
event. The cumulative abnormal return on shareholder value (CARSHV) represents the sum of abnormal returns over the event
window.
At the end of the ﬁrst step, it is customary to calculate the average cumulative abnormal return across all ﬁrm-instances in the
sample in order to determine whether the value of the event is, on average, positive or negative. In the second step, the event
study uses the cumulative abnormal return on shareholder value (CARSHV) as a dependent variable and regresses it on a number
of characteristics that might explain the variability in the values of the ﬁrm-instance observations.
2.2. Dependent variables in previous event studies
The large majority of event studies conducted in ﬁnance and accounting and all event studies conducted in marketing use
CARSHV as their dependent variable. Thus, these event studies (implicitly) assume that an event impacts all value components
of the ﬁrm (i.e., operating business; non-operating assets and debt).
Much fewer event studies in ﬁnance and accounting used the cumulative abnormal returns on bond prices as their dependent
variable (Goh & Ederington, 1993; Hand, Holthausen, & Leftwich, 1992). These studies examine the effect of an event (e.g., a bond
rating agency announcement) on the prices of corporate bonds. Hence, these studies explicitly focus on the debt component in
shareholder value. A common challenge of these studies is that not all ﬁrms issue corporate bonds, and if a ﬁrm does so, its cor-
porate bonds just represent one part of the ﬁrm's total debt. So far, no prior work in accounting, ﬁnance, or marketing differen-
tiated between events that impact all value components of the ﬁrm and events that only impact the value of the ﬁrm's
operating business.
2.3. Treatment of ﬁrm's ﬁnancial structure in marketing-related event studies
Most marketing-related event studies ignore the differences in the ﬁnancial structure across ﬁrms (for reviews, see Johnston,
2007; Kimbrough & McAlister, 2009; Srinivasan & Hanssens, 2009, Sorescu et al., 2017). We have found only two event studies
in marketing in which the authors included the ﬁnancial structure as a control variable in the second step of their event study:
Gielens, Van de Gucht, Steenkamp, and Dekimpe (2008) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with high debt achieve lower CARSHV than do ﬁrms
with low debt. Chaney, Devinney, and Winer (1991) outline that their sample's leverage is slightly below the average.
3. Conceptual framework: considering the leverage effect in event studies
We proceed by developing a framework that outlines why CAROB should be the dependent variable for events that only impact
the value of the operating business. We ﬁrst elaborate on how valuation theory considers operating assets, non-operating assets,
and debt to derive a ﬁrm's total value of equity. Next, we illustrate how the event type should affect the choice of the dependent
variable, which can be either CARSHV or CAROB. We then elaborate on the leverage effect, introduced brieﬂy above, and describe
how it links the value of the operating business to shareholder value. We ﬁnally show how to derive CAROB from CARSHV.
3.1. Operating assets, non-operating assets, and debt
To understand why some events may inﬂuence all value components of the ﬁrm, whereas others inﬂuence only the value of
the operating business, it is important to understand the difference between operating assets and non-operating assets, and
how valuation theory considers these two kinds of assets as well as debt to derive a ﬁrm's total value of equity. We draw on lit-
erature from ﬁnance and accounting to derive these insights.
Operating assets are all those assets used by ﬁrms in their core business operations. Typical examples are property, plant, and
equipment, natural resources, and intangible assets. Non-operating assets, also called redundant assets, usually generate some
form of return, but do not play a role in a ﬁrm's operations. Typical examples are excess cash3 and marketable securities such
as commercial papers and money market instruments (Damodaran, 2006).
Deriving a ﬁrm's total value of equity entails ﬁrst evaluating operating assets, non-operating assets, and debt separately from
one another. Then, the value of non-operating assets is added to the value of the operating assets, and the value of debt is
subtracted (Damodaran, 2006; Schulze et al., 2012). Data for non-operating assets and debt can be taken from ﬁrms' balance
sheets, because they are likely to be incorporated into market capitalization (i.e., shareholder value) at close to their balance
sheet levels (Holthausen & Watts, 2001, p. 21).3 Only thepart of cash theﬁrmdoesnot need for its operations. Cashneeded for operations is included inworking capital and is not considered as an additional source
of value (Damodaran, 2001).
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We differentiate between two types of events. The ﬁrst type comprises events that inﬂuence all value components of the ﬁrm
(i.e., operating business; non-operating assets and debt); the second type comprises events that inﬂuence the value of the oper-
ating business, but not non-operating assets and debt.3.2.1. Events inﬂuencing all value components of the ﬁrm
Events typically explored in economics and ﬁnance, such as regulatory changes, natural disasters or mergers and acquisitions,
are likely to inﬂuence both the value of the operating business and non-operating assets and debt (MacKinlay, 1997). Regulatory
changes (e.g., change in tax level, introduction of a new tax) impact a ﬁrm's ability to earn money with its core business opera-
tions, and lead to a re-evaluation of non-operating assets and debt (see e.g., Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, & Mann, 2001). Natural or
man-made disasters (e.g., nuclear accident, earthquake) can damage a ﬁrm's property and equipment and, at the same time,
cause the prices of commercial papers to fall (e.g., Elton et al., 2001).
Our interdisciplinary literature review reveals just three marketing-related events for which theory suggests that an impact
on non-operating assets and debt is possible. First, the number of pre-orderings considerably exceeding the ﬁrm's production
plans can impact the relative importance of a ﬁrm's business segments and can require rising short-term debt to ﬁnance the pro-
duction increase (Hall, Hutchinson, & Michaelas, 2004). Second, ﬁring of the CMO can lead to an increase in debt as the
manager's tenure has been shown to be negatively associated with the ﬁrm's overall debt (Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997).
Third, the ﬁrm's decision to focus on the production of unique products in the future could make it increasingly difﬁcult for a
ﬁrm to “borrow because the speciﬁc use of capital reduces the probability of an alternative use in the event of bankruptcy”
(Bhaduri, 2002).
In addition to this literature review, we conducted in-depth interviews with a senior analyst and an investment fund manager,
both working for two large European banks, and asked them how they considered the impact of marketing-related events on the
ﬁrm's value. These experts stated that almost all events only lead to a re-evaluation of the operating business, but not of non-op-
erating assets and debt. More precisely, the senior analyst stated:“In fact, we only consider the effect of an event on the operating business by adjusting the respective assumptionsmade in the
valuationmodel.We take the non-operating assets and debt from the ﬁrm's balance sheet and do notmake any adjustments to
them following the event.Mergers and acquisitions are exceptions because theﬁrm is likely to conduct aﬁnancial restructuring
after the transaction that we have to consider.”Similarly, the investment fund manager said:“The effect of an event depends on the kind of event. We differentiate between two kinds of events. For example, if it is a new
product announcement, then wewill only consider the event's effect on the operating business through the top line. The other
kind of event is an acquisition. Here we also consider the event's effect on the non-operating business and debt.”These statements suggest that in practice even rather drastic marketing events like the number of pre-orderings consider-
ably exceeding the ﬁrm's production plans, the ﬁring of the CMO, or the ﬁrm's decision to focus on the production of unique
products in the future, only lead to a re-evaluation of the value of the ﬁrm's operating business. Nevertheless, we argue that
the more likely an event impacts the ﬁrm's risk structure or ﬁnancial needs above and beyond its working capital, the more re-
searchers should consider an impact of the event on non-operating assets and debt as well. The reason is that for these kinds of
events, at least theoretically, we cannot exclude an impact on debt (e.g., through impact on ﬁrm's credit rating) or non-operat-
ing assets (e.g., alternative use of excess cash with different return) ex ante. An example might be the announcement of a new
project like the foundation of a research center abroad that has the purpose to develop several new products in new business
areas. These “make” type announcements with a strategic character are likely to be associated with substantial capital require-
ments that go beyond the ﬁrm's working capital and could impact the ﬁrm's risk structure through a shift in the importance of
the ﬁrm's business segments.3.2.2. Events inﬂuencing only the value of the operating business
For the large majority of marketing events, we do not expect an effect on non-operating assets and debt. In fact, marketing ac-
tions are in most cases exclusively targeted at the operating business and are inseparable from a ﬁrm's core operating assets.
Therefore, we would not expect events like the release of ratings of product quality, company name changes, celebrity endorse-
ments, customer satisfaction announcements or brand value announcements to inﬂuence a ﬁrm's non-operating assets and debt.
We propose that when researchers use CARSHV as their dependent variable, they need to provide theoretical support to the
claim that the analyzed event inﬂuences not only a ﬁrm's operating business but also its non-operating assets and debt. If no
such theoretical support exists, then researchers should use CAROB as the dependent variable. Researchers might also consider
reporting results for both models, i.e. one using CAROB and another using CARSHV, and then argue which one is most suitable
for the problem at hand. Taken together, we want to emphasize that researchers who conduct an event study need to much better
justify their choice of the dependent variable.
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According to valuation theory, a ﬁrm's shareholder value (SHV) is the value of the operating business (OB) plus non-operating
assets (NOA) minus debt (DEBT) (Damodaran, 2006; Schulze et al., 2012):4 Plea
characte
ﬁrms ca
than its
5 Diff
turn onSHV ¼ OBþ NOA−DEBT ð1ÞThus, a ﬁrm having an operating business worth $100, non-operating assets of $10 and debt of $45.5 will have a shareholder
value of $64.5 (=$100 + $10 − $45.5). The leverage effect (LE) describes how a 1% change in operating business translates into a
percentage change in shareholder value. It reﬂects the share of the operating business at shareholder value (Schulze et al.,
2012):LE ¼ OB
SHV
¼ SHV−NOAþ DEBT
SHV
ð2ÞThe leverage effect of the example ﬁrm described above is 1.55 (LE = 100 / 64.5). This means that a 1% increase in the value of
the operating business translates into a 1.55% (1 / 0.645) increase in shareholder value. We choose this value because it is the av-
erage value of the leverage effect of N2000 companies included in Standard & Poor's (S&P) Total Market Index across ten years
(Schulze et al., 2012). Thus, on average, a 1% change in operating business yields a 1.55% change in shareholder value.
Eq. (2) describes the leverage effect with three publicly available variables. The shareholder value represents market capitali-
zation and is the product of a ﬁrm's outstanding shares and the share price. Non-operating assets and debt are available in a ﬁrm's
balance sheet, disclosed in quarterly and annual reports. Firms featuring more debt than non-operating assets show leverage ef-
fects that are N1; ﬁrms featuring more non-operating assets than debt show leverage effects below 1. For a ﬁrm with the same
amounts of non-operating assets and debt, the leverage effect is exactly 1 (Schulze et al., 2012).
We kindly advise the reader not to mistake the leverage effect for the leverage ratio. The leverage ratio is a variable that de-
scribes a ﬁrm's amount of debt (e.g., measured as long-term debt; long-term debt + short-term debt) relative to ﬁrm size (e.g.,
measured as book value of equity; market capitalization; total assets; debt + equity) (e.g., Damodaran, 2006). The leverage effect4
was introduced by Schulze et al. (2012) into marketing and describes the effect of the value of the operating business with respect
to shareholder value. Its size depends on the amount of debt and non-operating assets a ﬁrm owns.
3.4. Derivation of cumulative abnormal returns on value of operating business
Formally, the cumulative abnormal return on shareholder value (CARSHV) can be expressed as:CARSHVi ¼ RSHVi −E RSHVi
 
¼ SHViafter−SHVibefore
SHVibefore
−E RSHVi
 
ð3Þwhere
CARiSHV = cumulative abnormal return on shareholder value of the ﬁrm with ﬁrm-instance observation i,
SHViafter = post-event shareholder value of the ﬁrm with ﬁrm-instance observation i,
SHVibefore = pre-event shareholder value of the ﬁrm with ﬁrm-instance observation i, and
E(RiSHV) = expected rate of return on the share price of the ﬁrm with ﬁrm-instance observation i.5
The difference in shareholder value (SHViafter − SHVibefore) adjusted for the expected rate of return is what is sometimes also
called the net present value of the event (Rao, Chandy, & Prabhu, 2008; Sorescu, Chandy, & Prabhu, 2003). Analogously, we can
express CAROB as:CAROBi ¼ ROBi −E ROBi
 
¼ OBiafter−OBibefore
OBibefore
−E ROBi
 
ð4Þse note that in ﬁnance and accounting the term leverage effect describes the generally negative correlation between an asset return and its volatility, which is a
ristic of many equity markets (e.g., Ait-Sahalia, Fan, & Li, 2013; Cheung & Ng, 1992). Furthermore, the term leverage effect is frequently used to describe that
n increase their return on equity by investing borrowed money (instead of equity) into the operating business if the return on the borrowed money is higher
cost (e.g., Damodaran, 2006).
erent approaches are used such as themarket model, Capital Asset Pricing Model or the Fama-French-three-factor model to determine the expected rate of re-
shareholder value (E(RSHV)).
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CARiOB = cumulative abnormal return on the value of the operating business of the ﬁrm with ﬁrm-instance observation i,
OBiafter = post-event value of the operating business of the ﬁrm with ﬁrm-instance observation i,
OBibefore = pre-event value of the operating business of the ﬁrm with ﬁrm-instance observation i, and
E(RiOB) = expected rate of return on the value of the operating business of the ﬁrm with ﬁrm-instance observation i.
We now derive the relation between CAROB and CARSHV. We start by considering the ﬁrst part on the right-hand side of Eq. (4),
the rate of return, RiOB, and solve Eq. (1) for OB, which we then insert into Eq. (5):Table 1
Relation
CAROB
(Posit
CAROB
(Nega
LE: Leve
solute vROBi ¼
OBiafter−OBibefore
OBibefore
¼ SHViafter−SHVibefore
SHVibefore−NOAi þ DEBTi
ð5Þ
1Multiplying Eq. (5) by
SHVibefore
1
SHVibefore
enables us to rewrite Eq. (5) as:ROBi ¼
SHViafter−SHVibefore
 
 1
SHVibefore
SHVibefore−NOAi þ DEBTi
 
 1
SHVibefore
¼
SHViafter−SHVibefore
SHVibefore
DEBTi−NOAið Þ
SHVibefore
þ 1
¼ R
SHV
i
LEibefore
ð6ÞAnalogously, we determine the expected rate of return on the value of the operating business E(RiOB) as:E ROBi
 
¼
E RSHVi
 
LEibefore
ð7ÞFinally, substituting Eqs. (7) and (6) in Eq. (4) yields:CAROBi ¼
RSHVi
LEibefore
−
E RSHVi
 
LEibefore
¼ CAR
SHV
i
LEibefore
: ð8ÞEq. (8) shows that the leverage effect links the two abnormal return measures. For each ﬁrm-instance observation, CARSHV
equals CAROB if the leverage effect is 1 (i.e., when non-operating assets equal debt). If the leverage effect is larger than 1, CARSHV
will be larger than CAROB if CAROB is positive, and smaller than CAROB if CAROB is negative. Conversely, if the leverage effect is
smaller than 1, CARSHV will be smaller than CAROB if CAROB is positive, and larger than CAROB if CAROB is negative. Table 1 sum-
marizes the relationship between CARSHV and CAROB for different values of the leverage effect and signs of CAROB.
Thus, large differences between CARSHV and CAROB occur for ﬁrms with leverage effects whose values are far away from 1. This
ﬁnding implies that taking the mean of CARSHV across ﬁrm-instance observations is problematic if the ﬁrm-instance observations
pertain to ﬁrms with different ﬁnancial structures represented by different leverage effects. The reason is that the leverage effect
inﬂates or deﬂates the “true” effect of an event, which is captured by CAROB.ships between cumulative abnormal returns on shareholder value (CARSHV) and operating business (CAROB).
LE > 1LE = 1 LE < 1
> 0
ive effect)
CARSHV = CAROB
(Correct estimation)
CARSHV > CAROB
(Inflation of “true” effect)
CARSHV < CAROB
(Deflation of “true” effect)
< 0
tive effect)
CARSHV = CAROB
(Correct estimation)
CARSHV < CAROB
|CARSHV| > |CAROB|
(Inflation of “true” effect)
CARSHV > CAROB
|CARSHV| < |CAROB|
(Deflation of “true” effect)
rage effect, CARSHV: cumulative abnormal return on shareholder value; CAROB: cumulative abnormal return on operating business; |x| represents the ab-
alue of x.
Table 2
Setup and results for the numerical example.
Calculations Shop A Shop B Shop C
0001$0001$0001$ssenisubgnitarepofoeulaVIesacesaB
0$0001$0$stessagnitarepo-noNII
009$0$0$tbeDIII
IV = I + II – 001$0002$0001$)stneveerofeb(eulavredloherahSIII
0.015.00.1tceffeegareveLVI/I=V
9 observations (average leverage effect = 3.83)
Event VI Value of Event 1 (Event 2; Event 3) $30 (– $60; $50) $30 (– $60; $50) $30 (– $60; $50)
:2tnevE(03$:1tnevE)tneverep(eulavnaeMIIV – $60; Event 3: $50)
66.6$)llarevo(eulavnaeMIIIV
IX = IV + VI Shareholder value (after events) $1030 ($940; $1050) $2030 ($1,940; $2050) $130 ($40; $150)
CARSHV X = VI / IV CAR SHV (%3)tneve&pohsrep( – 6%; 5%) 1.5% (– 3%; 2.5%) 30% (– 60%; 50%)
XI Mean CARSHV :2tnevE(%05.11:1tnevE)tneverep( – 23.00%; Event 3: 19.17%)
XII Mean CARSHV %65.2)llarevo(
CAROB XIII = VI / I CAR OB (%3)tneve&pohsrep( – 6%; 5%) 3% (– 6%; 5%) 3% (– 6%; 5%)
XIV Mean CAROB :2tnevE(%00.3:1tnevE)tneverep( – 6.00%; Event 3: 5.00%)
XV Mean CAROB %76.0)llarevo(
XVI Correlation between CAROB 00.0tceffeegareveldna
8 observations (average leverage effect = 3.06)
(03$)tneve&pohsrep(eulaVIIVXtnevE – $60; 50) $30 (– $60; $50) $30 (– $60)
:2tnevE(03$:1tnevE)tneverep(eulavnaeMIIIVX – $60; Event 3: $50)
52.1$)llarevo(eulavnaeMXIX
XX = IV + XVII Shareholder value (after events) $1030 ($940; $1050) $2030 ($1940; $2050) $130 ($40)
CARSHV XXI = XVII / IV CAR SHV (%3)tneve&pohsrep( – 6%; 5%) 1.5% (– 3%; 2.5%) 30% (– 60%)
XXII Mean CARSHV :2tnevE(%05.11:1tnevE)tneverep( – 23.00%; Event 3: 3.75%)
XXIII Mean CARSHV (overall) – 3.38%
CAROB XXIV = XVII / I CAR OB (%3)tneve&pohsrep( – 6%; 5%) 3% (– 6%; 5%) 3% (– 6%)
XXV Mean CAROB :2tnevE(%00.3:1tnevE)tneverep( – 6.00%; Event 3: 5.00%)
XXVI Mean CAROB %31.0)llarevo(
XXVII Correlation between CAROBand leverage effect – 0.19
CAR: cumulative abnormal returns; OB: operating business; SHV: shareholder value (here represents market capitalization).
647B. Skiera et al. / International Journal of Research in Marketing 34 (2017) 641–6594. Illustration of conceptual framework
4.1. Numerical example
We use the following simpliﬁed example to illustrate our conceptual framework: Three ﬁrms A, B, and C represent three ice
cream shops with identical characteristics and an operating business that is worth $1000 (i.e., the discounted value of the ice
cream cash ﬂows is $1000). We also assume that each ice cream shop owns $1000 in excess cash which is not needed to run
the ongoing operations. Thus, each ice cream shop has a value of $1000 + $1000 = $2000.
Now, each ice cream shop is sold for its value of $2000. The buyer of the ﬁrst ice cream shop took $1000 out of his private
money and the $1000 that the shop had as excess cash to pay the seller. Thus, after the transaction, the value of this ﬁrst shop
is $1000 because the excess cash is gone. The buyer of the second ice cream shop takes $2000 of his private money to pay the
seller. Thus, after the transaction, the value of this second shop is still $2000. The buyer of the third ice cream shop takes $100
of his private money, the $1000 that the shop had as excess cash, and a loan of $900 from the bank on behalf of the ice cream
shop to pay the seller. Let the interest rate of the loan be equivalent to the discount rate so that the net present value of the
loan equals $900. Thus, after the transaction, the value of this third shop is $100.
Three events occur. The ﬁrst event (“celebrity endorsement”) is that a local celebrity becomes a frequent customer of the ice
cream shops, thus attracting new customers. Let the net present value of the increase in proﬁts (for simpliﬁcation purposes, we
assume that proﬁts equal cash ﬂows) of each ice cream shop be $30. The second event (“rating of product quality”) is that the
local newspaper publishes an article revealing that the ice cream sold in the three shops is of low quality. Let the net present
value of the change in proﬁts of each ice cream shop be −$60. The third event (“company name change”) is the renaming of
each shop with a more distinctive company name and let the net present value of the increase in proﬁts be $50. These three
events inﬂuence the values of the three shops' operating businesses equally, but they do not impact the non-operating assets
(here excess cash not required to run the business) and debt of any of the three shops.
Table 2 summarizes the setup and the results of this numerical example that mimics an event study. Consistent with the lan-
guage used in real event studies, we call the ice cream shop's values “shareholder values”. The three shops (A, B, and C) have the
same value of the operating business, $1000 (row I). They differ only with respect to their ﬁnancial structures (i.e., non-operating
assets and debt, see rows II and III). Thus, the shareholder values are $1000 for shop A; $2000 for shop B; and $100 for shop C (see
row IV). The leverage effect is the ratio between the value of the operating business and the shareholder value (Schulze et al.,
648 B. Skiera et al. / International Journal of Research in Marketing 34 (2017) 641–6592012). Accordingly, the leverage effect of shop A is 1.0 ($1000/$1000), that of shop B is 0.5 ($1000/$2000), and that of shop C is
10.0 ($1000/$100) (see row V).
The events change the value of each ﬁrm's operating business by $30 (event 1), −$60 (event 2), and $50 (event 3) (see row
VI).6 These “true” values are the net present values of the events (Rao et al., 2008; Sorescu et al., 2003) and are, on average, pos-
itive (1/3 × ($30–$60 + $50) = $6.67). Thus, we have nine (3 × 3) observations, and the correlation between the values of the
events (CAROB) and the leverage effect is 0 (i.e., the correlation between the values in row XIII and those in row V; the result is
displayed in row XVI). After event 1 (event 2; event 3), the shareholder value of shop A is $1030 ($940; $1050), that of shop B is
$2030 ($1940; $2050), and that of shop C is $130 ($40; $150) (see row IX, which is the sum of rows IV and VI).
CAROB is 3% for the ﬁrst event, −6% for the second event, and 5% for the third event (see row XIII). The returns associated with
each event are the same across all three shops, correctly reﬂecting that the three shops were affected equally. The average CAROB is
0.67% (see row XV). In contrast, CARSHV differs across events and shops (see row X, which is derived by comparing rows IV and
IX), suggesting that the events affected the shops differently. Differences in the ﬁrms' leverage effects cause these deviations. For
shop A (B; C) the CARSHV is 3% (1.5%; 30%) for event 1, −6% (−3%; −60%) for event 2, and 5% (2.5%; 50%) for event 3 (row X).
In absolute terms, the value of CARSHV is highest for shop C (row X), because that shop's debt leverages the cumulative abnormal
returns on the value of the operating business (CAROB) by a factor of 10 (row V). The value of CARSHV is lowest for shop B, whose non-
operating assets leverage the CAROB by a factor of 0.5. The average CARSHV across the three shops is 11.50% for the ﬁrst event,
−23.00% for the second, and 19.17% for the third event (row XI) and the average CARSHV across ﬁrms and events is 2.56%. This value
is 3.83 times higher than the corresponding CAROB (0.67%) (compare rows XII and XV). This increase is equal to the value of the leverage
effect. A comparison between CAROB and CARSHV (rows XIII and X) shows that if a shop's leverage effect is smaller than 1, the absolute
value of CARSHV is smaller than the absolute value of CAROB (and vice versa for a leverage effect N 1).
4.2. Impact of leverage effect on average percentage value of event
In the preceding example we considered a situation in which the correlation between the value of each event and the leverage
effect was 0. We will now examine what happens if the correlation between the leverage effect and the event value is no longer 0.
This examination is important, because a situation where the leverage effect is correlated with the dependent variable can lead to
stronger differences between models using CARSHV and models using CAROB.
We therefore drop one observation, speciﬁcally, the ninth observation, so that shop C is not subject to the third event, which
features a value of $50. Thus, we now consider just 8 observations. The average “true” value of event 3 is still positive ($1.25). Yet,
the correlation between the values of all the events (or CAROB) and the leverage effect is now negative (compare −0.19 in row
XXVII with 0.00 in row XVI).
Whereas the average CAROB of the third event remains unaffected (compare rows XIV and XXV), the average CARSHV of the third
event decreases from 19.17% to 3.75% (compare rows XI and XXII). The two shops that are subject to the third event are characterized
by relatively low leverage effects, so that the absolute size of the event has a moderate effect on the percentage change in shareholder
value. Not surprisingly, the average CAROB across ﬁrms and events for 8 observations (0.13%) is smaller than for 9 observations (0.67%),
but its sign remains the same (compare rows XXVI and XV) and is still in line with the average positive value of the events.
In contrast, the average CARSHV changes sign. It is now negative (−3.38%) (row XXIII) and no longer reﬂects the average pos-
itive value of the events. Hence, differences in shops' leverage effects may lead to a situation in which the average value of CARSHV
differs from the average “true” value of the event not only in size but also in sign.
4.3. Explaining differences in event values
The second step of an event study usually uses CARSHV as the dependent variable and regresses it on characteristics of the
event to identify determinants of the value of the event. We do so for 8 and for 9 observations. In Model I, we calculate a tradi-
tional model in which the dependent variable is CARSHV and the independent variables are two dummy variables corresponding,
respectively, to events 2 (value of $−60) and 3 (value of $50). Thus, the two dummy variables represent the characteristics that are
used to explain CARSHV. InModel II, we include the leverage effect as an additional independent variable. InModel III, we use CAROB as the
dependent variable and the two dummy variables of events 2 and 3 as independent variables. Table 3 summarizes the results.
When we compare the results for 8 and for 9 observations, several remarkable ﬁndings emerge. First, the results for the two
regressions differ for the dependent variable CARSHV (Models I and II). The coefﬁcient of the dummy variable of event 3 is positive
in the case of 9 observations and negative in the case of 8 observations. Yet, given the “true” values of the events, the coefﬁcient of
event 3 should be positive (i.e., larger than that of event 1, which is zero here). Thus, the use of CARSHV as a dependent variable
can yield coefﬁcients whose signs do not match the signs of the “true” values of the corresponding events. Notably, controlling
linearly for the leverage effect (Model II) does not prevent this result from occurring. The reason is that the leverage effect mod-
erates each independent variable and thus cannot simply be included as a control variable in the regression.
The only way to avoid obtaining these misleading ﬁndings is to use CAROB as the dependent variable (Model III), which is easy
to accomplish as CAROB is the ratio between CARSHV and the leverage effect. The sizes and signs of the coefﬁcients obtained using6 We select rather large values for the events for the ease of exposition. Additionally, we assume that the expected return of the stock is zero. This assumption just
implies that the return of a corresponding benchmark—for example, the average return of other publicly listed ﬁrms in the same industry—is zero. This assumption
could easily be relaxed at the expense of making the exposition more difﬁcult.
Table 3
Regression results for the numerical example.
Model I: CARSHV Model II: CARSHV Model III: CAROB
9 observations 8 observations 9 observations 8 observations 9 observations 8 observations
DummyEvent2 −0.3450 −0.3450 −0.3450 −0.3450 −0.09 −0.09
DummyEvent3 0.0767 −0.0775 0.0767 −0.1235 0.02 0.02
Leverage 0.0067 0.0149
Intercept 0.1150 0.1150 0.0894 0.1722 0.03 0.03
N 9 8 9 8 9 8
R2 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.48 1.00 1.00
Adj. R2 0.24 0.20 0.11 0.10 1.00 1.00
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pendent variable and the independent variables are the interactions of the leverage effect with all of the previous independent
variables. We prefer to change the dependent variable instead of all independent variables because the dependent variable “oper-
ating business” more appropriately describes what the marketing-related event is supposed to impact. Additionally, models with
interactions usually consider direct effects of independent variables and selectively add a few interactions to make more nuanced
statements rather than only considering the impact of interactions with no direct effects.
4.4. Relationship between CAROB and the efﬁcient market hypothesis
It is important to note that models using CAROB rely on the efﬁcient market hypothesis just like models using CARSHV. That is,
both types of models (i.e., those using CAROB and those using CARSHV) assume that markets are efﬁcient and that investors con-
sider differences in ﬁrms' ﬁnancial structures. Hence, in the numerical example, the ﬁnancial market is right in assigning different
CARSHV values (i.e., percentage values) to the three ﬁrms for an event that impacts the shops' operating businesses equally, but
does not impact non-operating assets and debt. Only the differences in the shops' ﬁnancial structures translate the event's same
(absolute and relative) effect on the values of the shops' operating businesses into different (relative) CARSHV values.
In case of a marketing-related event that inﬂuences the value of the operating business, but not non-operating assets and debt,
looking at these different CARSHV values will likely result in the misleading conclusion that the event affected the shops differently.
This conclusion, however, is not true because the differences in CARSHV occur because of the differences in the shops' ﬁnancial
structures. The empirical study in Appendix A outlines that differences across ﬁrms' ﬁnancial structures are fairly large.
Therefore, for events that only inﬂuence the value of the operating business, CAROB should be used as the dependent variable.
As we elaborated in Section 3.4, the derivation of CAROB relies on valuation theory which suggests that a ﬁrm's shareholder value
equals the value of the operating business plus non-operating assets minus debt (e.g., Damodaran, 2006; Schulze et al., 2012).
Thus, based on valuation theory we can analyze how an event impacts the value of the operating business by deducting non-op-
erating assets from and adding debt to shareholder value.
In what follows we present a simulation study in which we further explore the deviations between CAROB and CARSHV and analyze
under which conditions these deviations are particularly strongly dispersed. Then we reanalyze three previously published marketing-
related event studies and compare the results that emerge when using CAROB instead of CARSHV as the dependent variable.
5. Simulation study
In the following simulation study, we further explore the differences between CAROB and CARSHV and analyze under which con-
ditions these differences are particularly strong. In particular, we analyze the results obtained in each of the two steps of an event
study. For the ﬁrst step, which aims to determine the cumulative abnormal returns associated with speciﬁc events, we show how
strongly CARSHV differs from CAROB and we quantify how often one can expect signs of CARSHV and CAROB to differ. Also, we an-
alyze how often models using CARSHV fail to detect a signiﬁcant cumulative abnormal return and how often they erroneously ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant cumulative abnormal return.
For the second step, which aims to explain differences in event values across observations, we carry out analyses similar to those de-
scribed for the ﬁrst step, but now focus on the differences in the independent variables' coefﬁcients of models using CARSHV and CAROB,
respectively.We analyzewhether the signs and signiﬁcance levels of the coefﬁcients differ between the twomodels andwe analyze how
often models using CARSHV fail to detect a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient and how often they erroneously ﬁnd a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient.
5.1. Setup of simulation study
We build upon Eq. (8) and assume that the relationship between CAROB (the dependent variable) and two independent vari-
ables x1 and x2 is:CAROBi ¼ αþ β1x1i þ β2x2i: ð9Þ
Table 4
Setup of simulation study.
Experimental factors Number of factor levels Factor levels
Leverage effect 1 • Random draw from log-logistic distribution ﬁtted on real data
(scale parameter = 4.41, shape parameter = 1.22)
Coefﬁcient α, β1, β2 1 • α = 0.1, β1 = 0.2, β2 = −0.4
Variable x1 1 • Uniform Distribution [−10; +10]
Variable x2 1 • Uniform distribution [−10; +10]
Number of ﬁrm-instance
Observations (i.e., sample size)
2 • Small: 100
• Large: 500
Number of experimental
settings
2
Number of replications 100
Number of event studies 100 · 2 = 200
650 B. Skiera et al. / International Journal of Research in Marketing 34 (2017) 641–659For each ﬁrm-instance observation, we randomly draw values for variables x1 and x2 from uniform distributions and set α =
0.1, β1 = 0.2 and β2 = −0.4. We also randomly draw a value for the leverage effect from a log-logistic distribution that best ﬁts
the empirical distribution of the leverage effects of ﬁrms listed in the S&P Total Market Index (for a detailed analysis of the em-
pirical distribution of ﬁrms' leverage effects see Appendix A). To account for differences in sample size—notably, sample sizes are
usually rather small in event studies—we distinguish between a small sample with 100 ﬁrm-instance observations and a larger
sample with 500 ﬁrm-instance observations. For each of these two experimental settings, we replicate the analysis 100 times,
so that we generate data for 200 different event studies (i.e., 100 studies each contain 100 ﬁrm-instance observations; the
other 100 studies each contain 500 ﬁrm-instance observations). Table 4 summarizes the setup of this simulation study.
5.2. Calculation of percentage deviations
We start by conducting the ﬁrst step of an event study and calculate for each ﬁrm-instance observation i in an event study r
the values of CARriOB (Eq. 9) and CARriSHV (=CARriOB×LEri, see Eq. 8). We then calculate for every event study r the average values
CARriOB and CARrSHV as well as LEr. We calculate our variable of interest, namely the ratio of CARrSHV and CARrOB as follows:7 Not
study ri
insteadRATIOCARr ¼
CARSHVr
CAROBr
−1 ð10ÞA value of RATIOrCAR equal to 0 indicates that CARrSHV is equal to CARrOB.7 Values of RATIOrCAR ≠ 0 indicate that CARrSHV differs
from CARrOBand negative values indicate that even the signs of CARrSHV and CARrOB differ.
Additionally, we look at how strongly the results differ for the second step of the event study. Therefore, we run two separate
regressions for each event study r with CARriSHV, respectively CARriOB, as the dependent variable and x1ri and x2ri as the independent
variables. Again, we calculate the percentage deviation of each event study's estimated coefﬁcients for CARSHV (αrest, βr1est, βr2est) from
the “true” values of the CAROB model (α = 0.1, β1 = 0.2, β2 = −0.4):RATIOCoeffr ¼
CoeffSHVr
CoeffOBr
−1 with : Coeffr ¼ αr;β1r;β2rf g ð11ÞThe interpretation of RATIOrCoeff is similar to that of RATIOrCAR. RATIOrCoeff = 0 indicates that the estimated coefﬁcient is equal to
the “true” value7. Again, values of RATIOrCoeff ≠ 0 indicate that the estimated coefﬁcients differ from the true values and negative
values indicate that even the signs of the coefﬁcients differ.
5.3. Illustration of simulation study's results using the numerical example
We illustrate the interpretation of RATIOrCAR and RATIOrCoeff by reconsidering our numerical example from Section 4. In the case
of 9 observations, the average CARSHV = 2.56% (row XII in Table 2) is much larger than the average value of CAROB = 0.67 (row
XV in Table 2). Thus, RATIOCAR = (2.56 / 0.67) − 1 = 2.83. This result indicates that CARSHV is larger than CAROB.
The comparison of the estimated coefﬁcients of the regression model using CARSHV as the dependent variable (Model 1, Table
3) with the coefﬁcients of the regression model using CAROB as the dependent variable (Model 3, Table 3) yields RATIOEvent2 =
(−0.3450 / −0.09) − 1 = 2.83, RATIOEvent3 = (0.0767 / 0.02) − 1 = 2.83 and RATIOintercept = (0.1150 / 0.03) − 1 = 2.83.
Here, again, ignoring leverage effects increases all values.e that RATIO = 0 could be associated with non-zero deviations for individual ﬁrm-instance observations which even out on the sample level. Our simulation
ghtly captures this case because it could also occur in reality. Exclusion of this case would lead to an overestimation of the error made when choosing CARSHV
of CAROB as the dependent variable, thus exaggerating the risk of deriving wrong substantive conclusions in real event studies.
Fig. 1. Histogram of ratio (RATIOrCAR) between CARSHV and CAROB. Notes: Mean = 0.11, SD = 12.21, N = 200. For better readability, the histogram just includes
−10 b RATIOCAR b 10.
Fig. 2. Histogram of ratio (RATIOrCoeff) between coefﬁcients of models with CARSHV as dependent variable and coefﬁcients of models with CAROB as dependent var-
iable. Notes: Mean = 0.06, SD = 0.55, N = 200 event studies × 3 coefﬁcients = 600.
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and hence, negative.8 Also, the coefﬁcients of the model using CARSHV as the dependent variable (Model 1, Table 3) differ from
those of the model using CAROB as the dependent variable (Model 3, Table 3). In particular, RATIOEvent2 = (−0.3450 / −0.09)
− 1 = 2.83, RATIOEvent3 = (−0.0775 / 0.02) − 1 = −4.88, and RATIOintercept = (0.1150 / 0.03) − 1 = 2.83. Hence, RATIOEvent3
being negative indicates that the cofﬁcient of the dummy variable for Event 3 has a different sign in the model with CARSHV as the
dependent variable compared to the model with CAROB as the dependent variable.5.4. Results of simulation study
Across all 200 event studies that we simulated, the average values are for CARSHV = 0.133, for CAROB = 0.100 and for
RATIOCAR = 0.11. The average RATIOCAR appears to be small, but its standard deviation is very high (12.21); it varies from
−122.34 to 104.51. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the signs between CARrSHV and CARrOB differ in 10.5% of all event studies (i.e., RATIO-
r
CAR b 0); the correlation between CARrSHV and CARrOB is only 0.10. These results suggest that if researchers carried out many event
studies per event type, then the inﬂating and deﬂating effects of the ﬁrms' leverage effects would largely cancel out. The reality,
however, is that researchers usually just carry out one event study per event type and that CARrSHV and CARrOB are likely to differ8 We calculated RATIOCAR and RATIOCoeff with exact and not rounded values, e.g., RATIOCAR = (−3.375 / 0.125)− 1 =−28.
Table 5
Conditions leading to differences between estimated coefﬁcients and true values.
Independent variables Coeff SE
Correlation between CAROB and leverage effect 0.37 (0.71) ⁎⁎⁎
Sample size −0.32 (0.06) ⁎⁎⁎
Constant −0.00 (0.38)
N (200 event studies × 3 coefﬁcients (α, β1, β2)) 600
R-square 0.05
Dependent variable is RATIOCoeff. Coeff = coefﬁcient; SE = standard error.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.001 (two-sided).
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which shows the distribution of RATIOrCAR.
We also analyzed CARSHV's ability to detect cumulative abnormal returns that are signiﬁcantly different from zero (at a 5%
level). We ﬁnd that in 28.6% of all event studies in which CAROB is signiﬁcantly different from zero, models using CARSHV as the
dependent variable fail to reﬂect this signiﬁcance (false negative; type II error). Additionally, in 16.7% of all cases in which models
using CARSHV as a dependent variable ﬁnd a cumulative abnormal return signiﬁcantly different from zero, CAROB is not actually
signiﬁcant (false positive, type I error).
Fig. 2 shows the distribution of RATIOrCoeff. The average RATIOrCoeffacross event studies is 0.06 with a relatively large standard
deviation of 0.55. Thus, even though estimated coefﬁcients and true values do not differ much across event studies, they are
again likely to differ substantially on the basis of a single event study. Furthermore, in 7% of all cases even the signs of the coef-
ﬁcients differ.
We also analyzed differences in the signiﬁcance of coefﬁcients between models using CARSHV and CAROB. In 9.0% of all cases in
which coefﬁcients are actually signiﬁcant (at 5% level), models using CARSHV as the dependent variable fail to ﬁnd this signiﬁcance
(false negative; type II error). Additionally, in 1.7% of all cases in which models using CARSHV as dependent variable ﬁnd a signif-
icant effect, the corresponding models using CAROB indicate that no effect is present (false positive, type I error).
In order to analyze under which conditions the deviations of the estimated coefﬁcients from the true values are particularly
strongly dispersed, we run a linear regression with robust standard errors and use RATIOrCoeff as the dependent variable and the
correlation between CAROB and leverage effect as well as the sample size as the independent variables.
The results displayed in Table 5 show that a high deviation between estimated coefﬁcients and true values occurs in cases of
high correlation between CAROB and the leverage effect. This result is also in line with our numerical example, which showed large
deviations in the case of 8 observations, i.e., the case in which CAROB and the leverage effect were correlated. Furthermore, our
analysis reveals that this effect is stronger for small sample sizes than for large sample sizes. This result is particularly important,
as event studies usually rely on rather small sample sizes.
In summary, our simulation study shows that in an event study CARrSHV and CARrOB as well as their associated coefﬁcientsmight differ
substantially fromeachother. Furthermore, different signs of CARrSHV andCARrOB occur not only in our numerical example but also inN10%
of all event studies of our simulation study. Models using CARSHV as the dependent variable deviate particularly strongly from models
using CAROB in cases of a high correlation between CAROB and the leverage effect and when sample sizes are small.
Our analyses have shown that event studies that use CAROB instead of CARSHV as a dependent variable can yield substantially
different outcomes. We continue by comparing the results of three previously published marketing event studies that used CARSHV
as their dependent variable with the results of an analysis using identical data but in which CAROB is the dependent variable. We
start with the reanalysis of the event study that was conducted by Bornemann et al. (2015).9
6. First empirical study: reanalysis of the event study conducted by Bornemann et al. (2015)
6.1. Description of event study
In this event study, the authors examine how consumers' perceptions of the three most important product design dimensions (i.e.,
aesthetic, ergonomic, and symbolic value, see Creusen & Schoormans, 2005) as well as the interaction of each of these three design di-
mensions with functional product advantage are related to abnormal stock returns (i.e., CARSHV) following the unveiling of a new
product's visual appearance. To do so, the authors analyze data from the automotive and consumer electronics industries, combining per-
ceptual data at the consumer level with stock market data while controlling for brand familiarity, ﬁrm size and industry.
Aesthetic value is the design dimension most often discussed in literature and describes perceptions of the visual attractiveness
of a product: visual attractiveness is expected to positively inﬂuence a product's acceptance in the target market (Orth &
Malkewitz, 2008). Ergonomic value denotes the ability of a product to correctly communicate its utilitarian functions, and a
high degree of ergonomic value is likely to constitute one of the main reasons for buying a given product (Creusen &
Schoormans, 2005, p. 67). Finally, symbolic value is deﬁned as the degree to which a product's appearance is perceived to have
the potential to reﬂect the (desired) identity of its owner (Crilly, Moultrie, & Clarkson, 2004). The authors propose that investors9 We would like to take this opportunity to thank the authors of the three previously published event studies (Bornemann et al., 2015; Karpoff & Rankine, 1994;
Kulkarni, Vora, & Brown, 2003) for providing us with the data sets of their event studies.
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market reactions.
The authors ﬁnd that ergonomic value has a positive inﬂuence on CARSHV, whereas symbolic value has a negative inﬂuence on
CARSHV (we replicate their results in Model I, Table 6). Surprisingly, according to their results, aesthetic value does not have a main
effect on CARSHV, and only has a positive inﬂuence on CARSHV when considered in interaction with functional product advantage.
Additionally, the authors ﬁnd that the interaction of symbolic value and functional product advantage has a negative inﬂuence on
CARSHV.
The analyzed event (unveiling of the product's visual appearance) is clearly related to the sample ﬁrms' core business opera-
tions and consumers' perceptions of product design dimensions may inﬂuence the value of the operating business. However, they
do not inﬂuence the ﬁrms' non-operating assets and debt.
6.2. First step: calculating the average value of the event
To the data that the authors have kindly provided us with (CARSHV, all independent variables, event dates, and ﬁrm names), we
added ﬁrms' leverage effects, which we calculated using data on shareholder value, non-operating assets and debt from Compustat
and CRSP (for Compustat Data Items used to calculate the leverage effect see Appendix A).
The average leverage effect for the sample was 2.19 with a standard deviation of 1.66, resulting in an average cross-ﬁrm var-
iation coefﬁcient of 0.76. This average leverage effect is higher than the overall average leverage effect of the ﬁrms listed in the S&P
Total Market Index (1.54, see Appendix A). Still, 17% of ﬁrms in the sample featured leverage effect values smaller than 1 (i.e.,
more non-operating assets than debt). The lowest value for the leverage effect in the sample is 0.66; the highest is 9.37. Thus,
the impact of the observation with the highest leverage effect on the calculation of the event's average value is about 14.2
times higher (9.36/0.66) than the impact of the observation with the lowest leverage effect. Furthermore and importantly, we
ﬁnd a correlation of −0.27 between CAROB and the leverage effect.
In our analysis, we ﬁrst replicate their results and then replace their dependent variable CARSHV by CAROB. This analysis shows
that the sample's average CARSHV is 1.28%, and the average CAROB is 1.13%. Thus, the sample's average CARSHV is 13.27% higher
than its average CAROB. This result is in line with expectations, as we expect absolute CARSHV to be larger than absolute CAROB be-
cause the sample's average leverage effect is N1 (see also Table 1). In monetary terms the 13.27% represent $75 million for all
ﬁrms in the sample and an average of $0.9 million per ﬁrm. The parametric t-test shows that both CARSHV (t = 3.87, p b 0.01)
and CAROB (t = 3.79, p b 0.01) are signiﬁcantly different from zero. In line with this ﬁnding the non-parametric Wilcoxon
signed-rank test rejects the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns for both CARSHV (Z = 3.57, p b 0.01) and CAROB (Z =
3.37, p b 0.01); a generalized sign test also rejects the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns at the 5% level.
6.3. Second step: explaining differences in event value
Our ﬁrst regression (Model I in Table 6) replicates their results. It uses CARSHV as the dependent variable, together with the
following independent variables: aesthetic, ergonomic, and symbolic value, functional product advantage and interactions of
these three design dimensions with functional product advantage. We also control for brand familiarity, ﬁrm size and industry.
Next, we rerun the regression using CAROB instead of CARSHV as the dependent variable (Model II). Table 6 reports the results.
In contrast to the regression using CARSHV as the dependent variable (Model I), the regression with CAROB as the dependent
variable (Model II) conﬁrms all the theoretically expected effects. The signiﬁcance levels associated with the effects identiﬁed inTable 6
Comparison of results for CARSHV and CAROB as dependent variables.
Variables Regressions
Model I CARSHV Model II CAROB
β t β t
Functional product advantage 0.41 3.13 ⁎⁎ 0.27 2.16 ⁎
Aesthetic value 0.33 1.60 0.52 2.32 ⁎⁎
Ergonomic value 0.26 2.04 ⁎ 0.29 −3.14 ⁎
Symbolic value −0.43 −2.12 ⁎ −0.61 3.36 ⁎⁎
Aesthetic value × functional product advantage 0.31 2.09 ⁎ 0.49 3.36 ⁎⁎
Ergonomic value × functional product advantage 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.10
Symbolic value × functional product advantage −0.28 −2.04 ⁎ −0.42 −3.10 ⁎⁎
CV: industry −0.13 −1.01 −0.08 −0.67
CV: ﬁrm size −0.19 −1.98 −0.28 −2.99 ⁎⁎
CV: brand familiarity −0.41 −3.51 ⁎⁎ −0.25 −2.23 ⁎
R2 0.49 0.52
Adj. R2 0.41 0.45
N 83 83
CV: control variable. Independent variables are mean-centered to enhance the interpretability of the results.
⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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has a highly signiﬁcant positive effect in the regression using CAROB.
Hence, when carrying out marketing-related event studies, using CAROB as the dependent variable can enable the researcher to
detect underlying relationships between the event characteristics and ﬁnancial return that might not be observable when CARSHV
is used as the dependent variable. Importantly, our results show that using CAROB instead of CARSHV as the dependent variable can
yield much more nuanced insights on how marketing creates value, which in turn has direct and managerially relevant implica-
tions for the allocation of (here design-related) investments.
7. Second empirical study: reanalysis of a prior event study conducted by Kulkarni et al. (2003)
7.1. Description of event study
The second event study we reanalyze is by Kulkarni et al. (2003). In their study, the authors examine possible reasons for ﬁring
advertising agencies and relate these reasons to the stock price consequences using an event study. The reasons they consider in-
clude decline in sales, market share, and proﬁtability in the period preceding the ﬁring. Thus, the event “ﬁring the advertising
agency” is assumed to be the result of a decline in the advertiser's operating business, for which the ﬁrm attributed responsibility
to the advertising agency. This type of event is of a tactical nature and may inﬂuence the value of the operating business through a
change in advertising activities. Additionally, there is no compelling theory why the ﬁring of an advertising agency should inﬂu-
ence the value of a ﬁrm's non-operating assets and debt (e.g., Cochrane, 2005; Elton et al., 2001).
Kulkarni et al. (2003) calculate ﬁve regressions using CARSHV as the dependent variable and industry-adjusted measures for
growth in sales and return on equity as independent variables. They ﬁnd that the only variable that explains the variability in ab-
normal returns is the industry-adjusted growth rate in sales (i.e., growth in market share) over the medium term. Thus, they con-
clude that investors interpret the ﬁring of an advertising agency as a managerial conﬁrmation of a loss in market share, not as a
corrective action that can remedy a sales growth problem. They base their interpretation on their ﬁnding that ﬁrms that engaged
in advertising (“advertisers”) and whose market shares increased, achieved high abnormal returns, whereas advertisers that expe-
rienced a decrease in market share had low or negative abnormal returns.
7.2. First step: calculating the average value of the event
Again, we used the data the authors kindly provided us with (CARSHV, all independent variables, event dates, and ﬁrm names)
and collected the additional data that we needed to calculate the ﬁrms' leverage effects (i.e., data on shareholder value, non-op-
erating assets and debt from Compustat and CRSP).
The average leverage effect for the sample was 1.08 with a standard deviation of 0.26, resulting in an average cross-ﬁrm var-
iation coefﬁcient of 0.24. This average leverage effect is much lower than the overall average leverage effect of the ﬁrms listed in
the S&P Total Market Index (1.54, see Appendix A). 24% of the ﬁrms in the sample featured leverage effect values smaller than 1
(i.e., more non-operating assets than debt). The lowest value for the leverage effect in the sample is 0.86; the highest is 2.12. Thus,
the impact of the observation with the highest leverage effect on the calculation of the event's average value is about 2.5 times
higher (2.12/0.86) than the impact of the observation with the lowest leverage effect. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a correlation between
CAROB and the leverage effect of 0.14.
Our reanalysis shows that the sample's average CARSHV is −0.66%, and the average CAROB is −0.74%. Thus, the sample's aver-
age CAROB is 12.12% lower than its average CARSHV. In monetary terms the 12.12% represent $60.5 million for all ﬁrms in the sam-
ple and an average of $1.7 million per ﬁrm. However, on the basis of a parametric t-test neither CARSHV nor CAROB are signiﬁcantly
different from zero. Furthermore, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test and a generalized sign test fail to reject the null
hypothesis of zero abnormal returns for both CARSHV and CAROB.
That the sample's average CAROB is lower than its average CARSHV may seem surprising, as we might expect absolute CARSHV to
be larger than absolute CAROB because the sample's average leverage effect is N1 (see also Table 1). Note, however, that Table 1
makes statements about the relationships among CARSHV, CAROB, and the leverage effect for each ﬁrm-instance observation, but
not for the whole sample. The reason for this result stems from the size of the CAROB for the 24% of ﬁrms whose leverage effects
are smaller than 1: For negative CAROB, the average absolute value of CAROB is 73% larger than the sample mean. For positive
CAROB, the average absolute value of their CAROB is 22% smaller than the sample mean. As the leverage effect deﬂates the impact
of these observations featuring very low values (i.e., below average negative values, below average positive values), the average
CARSHV N average CAROB (|CAROB| b |CARSHV|).
7.3. Second step: explaining differences in event value
We replicate the ﬁfth and pivotal regression reported by Kulkarni et al. (2003), see their Table 4). The regression uses CARSHV
as the dependent variable, together with the following independent variables: industry-adjusted growth rate in sales (i.e., growth
in market share) over a medium term (SG4-IA), industry-adjusted return on equity (ROE-IA), and the interaction between SG4-IA
and ROE-IA (Model I in Table 7). After the replication, we recalculate the regression using CAROB instead of CARSHV as the depen-
dent variable (Model II). Table 7 reports the results.
Table 7
Comparison of results for CARSHV and CAROB as dependent variables.
Variables Regressions
Model I CARSHV Model II CAROB
Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E.
Intercept −0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.01
SG4-IA 0.09 0.04⁎ 0.08 0.04
ROE-IA 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
ROESG4 −0.03 0.04 −0.03 0.04
R2 0.21 0.20
Adj. R2 0.14 0.13
N 36 36
SG4-IA is the industry-adjusted growth in sales from quarter 4 to quarter 1; ROE-IA is the industry-adjusted return on equity; ROESG4 is the interaction between
ROE-IA and SG4-IA.
⁎ p b 0.05.
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term preceding the ﬁring of the advertising agency. They base this interpretation on the results of the regression model replicated
in Table 7 (Model I). The coefﬁcient of the market share over a medium term (SG4-IA) is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. However,
using CAROB as the dependent variable, as in Model II in Table 7, causes the coefﬁcient of the market share to decline slightly. Im-
portantly, the signiﬁcance of the market share coefﬁcient also disappears.
This reanalysis of the results published by Kulkarni et al. (2003) shows that when CAROB is used as a dependent variable in-
stead of CARSHV, different coefﬁcients are obtained, and the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient of the central variable, market share, dis-
appears when we use CAROB instead of CARSHV as the dependent variable. The importance of using CAROB instead of CARSHV
becomes even more obvious when we consider that the leverage effect of the sample in this study was only 1.08 with a very mod-
erate standard deviation (0.26) as well as a moderate cross-ﬁrm coefﬁcient of variation (0.24). Furthermore, the correlation be-
tween CAROB and the leverage effect is moderate, at only 0.14.8. Third empirical study: reanalysis of a prior event study conducted by Karpoff and Rankine (1994)
The third event study we reanalyze is by Karpoff and Rankine (1994). In this study, the authors examine the stock price reac-
tion to the announcement of a company name change. In line with prior research by Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987), Argenti,
Hansen, and Neslin (1988) and Bosch and Hirschey (1989) they expect to ﬁnd a positive effect of a company name change on
CARSHV.10 As the authors explain, they expect such a positive effect for two reasons: First, a company name change conveys infor-
mation about the ﬁrm's product lines. In particular, a name change can reﬂect a change into a new or broader product line and/or gives
the ﬁrm the ﬂexibility to expand into new product lines in the future. Second, a company name change conveys favorable information
about the ﬁrm's future performance. Speciﬁcally, managers hope to “improve the ﬁrm's recognition in the investment community”
(Wall Street Journal, 1980) and to “affect the ﬁrm's operations favorably by providing the ﬁrm with a common identity […] which
will eventually affect labor productivity and cash ﬂows” (Karpoff & Rankine, 1994). As these theoretical considerations illustrate, a com-
pany name change may inﬂuence the value of the ﬁrm's operating business, but not non-operating assets and debt.
Karpoff and Rankine (1994) analyzed whether CARSHV is signiﬁcantly different from zero for different subsamples of their data
set. They found that the evidence of a positive stock price reaction to the announcement of a company name change is rather
weak and sensitive to sample selection. Therefore, the authors suggest being cautious with statements about the positive valuation
effects of corporate name changes.
Again, the authors kindly provided us with their data set of 147 name change announcements that were made in the Wall
Street Journal (WSJ) from 1979 to 1987. The data set comprises information on the CARSHV calculated over a two-day event win-
dow, the event dates (i.e., announcement in Wall Street Journal), the ﬁrms that changed their names, and a dummy variable in-
dicating whether the company name change was mentioned or proposed in a proxy statement before the WSJ announcement.11
With these data, we were able to verify the authors' key statement that CARSHV is only positive and signiﬁcant over the two-day
event window in the subsample that comprises those company name changes that were not mentioned or proposed in a proxy
statement before the WSJ announcement. Across all observations of the total sample, the authors ﬁnd that CARSHV is positive,
but insigniﬁcant.
To the authors' data, we added the data that we needed to calculate the ﬁrms' leverage effects. Our ﬁnal sample comprises 110
name change announcements. We lose 37 observations compared to Karpoff and Rankine's original sample, because 10 ﬁrms are
no longer listed on Compustat/CRSP and 27 ﬁrms miss data on at least one of the variables required to calculate the leverage effect.
Reassuringly, Karpoff and Rankine's results are essentially unchanged when replicated using the sample of 110 observations.10 Karpoff and Rankine (1994) call CARSHV “cumulated average forecast error”.
11 Unfortunately and probably due to the fact that the original studywas conducted before N20 years, not all the variables used in the paperwere available in the data
set or could be retrieved from the databases in WRDS. We were able to reconstruct subsamples A, B, and D described in Table 1 of Karpoff and Rankine (1994).
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coefﬁcient of 0.57. This average leverage effect is higher than the overall average leverage effect of the ﬁrms listed in the S&P Total
Market Index (1.54, see Appendix A). Still, about 13% of ﬁrms in the sample featured leverage effect values smaller than 1 (i.e.,
more non-operating assets than debt). The lowest value for the leverage effect in the sample is 0.40; the highest is 6.78. Thus,
the impact of the observation with the highest leverage effect on the calculation of the event's average value is about 17 times
higher (6.78/0.40) than the impact of the observation with the lowest leverage effect. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a correlation of
0.15 between CAROB and the leverage effect.
Our reanalysis shows that the overall sample's average CARSHV is 0.58%, and the average CAROB is −0.01%. In monetary terms
this difference represents $28 million for all ﬁrms in the sample and an average of about $0.3 million per ﬁrm. On the basis of a
parametric t-test neither CARSHV nor CAROB are signiﬁcantly different from zero. Furthermore, the non-parametric Wilcoxon
signed-rank test and a generalized sign test fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns for both CARSHV and
CAROB. Although neither CARSHV nor CAROB are signiﬁcantly different from zero, this example illustrates that the heterogeneity
in the ﬁrms' leverage effects, which inﬂates the impact of observations pertaining to ﬁrms with large debt and deﬂates those
pertaining to ﬁrms with large non-operating assets, can provide misleading evidence regarding the sign of the event's impact.
In this study's sample, the positive correlation between the leverage effect and the event value (CAROB) indicates that ﬁrms
with high debt have greater event values. The observations pertaining to these ﬁrms are more heavily weighted in the calculation
of CARSHV, which is why CARSHV N CAROB and why the two variables even differ in their signs.
Like Karpoff and Rankine (1994), we split the sample into two subsamples. The one subsample comprises all ﬁrms whose
name changes were mentioned or proposed in the Wall Street Journal for the ﬁrst time. Thus, investors could not have become
aware of the company name change before the event date (i.e., the announcement in the Wall Street Journal). The other subsam-
ple comprises all the other ﬁrms whose name changes were mentioned or proposed in a proxy statement before the announce-
ment in the Wall Street Journal. As shown in Table 8, we ﬁnd that both CARSHV and CAROB are positive and signiﬁcantly different
form zero only in the subsample of ﬁrms whose name changes were mentioned or proposed in the Wall Street Journal for the ﬁrst
time. For the other subsample, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effects. Thus, our analysis conﬁrms Karpoff and Rankine's results.
9. Summary and conclusion
Marketing-related events frequently inﬂuence only the value of the operating business, but not non-operating assets and debt.
Examples of such marketing-related events are the unveiling of a new product's appearance, the ﬁring of advertising agencies, and
company name changes. We argue that event studies designed to analyze the effects of such events should use CAROB as their de-
pendent variable instead of CARSHV, which is currently used. The derivation of CAROB is straightforward: CARSHV is ﬁrst determined
as in traditional event studies and then simply divided by the leverage effect, which, in turn, can be calculated using just three
publicly-available variables.
The reanalysis of three previously published marketing event studies as well as our simulation study show that ignoring the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc leverage effects inﬂuences an event study's results in unpredictable ways. Table 9 summarizes the results of our re-
analysis of the three previously published marketing event studies.
We want to emphasize that it is up to the researchers who conduct an event study to justify their choice of the dependent
variable. The interviews that we conducted with industry experts suggest that investors and analysts do not adjust non-operating
assets and debt in their valuation models following marketing events. Instead, they only adjust the value of a ﬁrm's operating busi-
ness. In general, we argue that the more likely an event impacts the ﬁrm's risk structure or ﬁnancial needs above and beyond its
working capital, the more researchers should consider an impact of the event on non-operating assets and debt as well. The reason
is that for these kinds of events, at least theoretically, we cannot exclude an impact on debt (e.g., through impact on ﬁrm's credit
rating) or non-operating assets (e.g., alternative use of excess cash with different return) ex ante. Researchers might also considerTable 8
One-sample t-test and descriptive statistics for CARSHV and CAROB for different subsamples.
Mean SD n Comparison
Value
t df
Total sample
CARSHV 0.58% 0.05 110 0 1.33 109
CAROB −0.01% 0.04 110 0 −0.03 109
Name change announced in WSJ for the ﬁrst time
CARSHVa 1.20% 0.04 57 0 2.16⁎ 56
CAROBa 0.85% 0.03 57 0 2.01⁎ 56
Name change announced in proxy statement before WSJ
CARSHV −0.09% 0.05 53 0 −0.14 52
CAROB −0.93% 0.04 53 0 −1.58 52
SD = Standard deviation. df: degrees of freedom.
⁎ p b 0.05.
a Non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test rejects the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns at 10% level for both CARSHV (Z = 1.88, p b 0.10) and CAROB
(Z = 1.67, p b 0.10); a generalized sign test also rejects the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns at the 10% level.
Table 9
Summary of reanalysis of previously published marketing event studies.
Bornemann et al. (2015) Kulkarni et al. (2003) Karpoff and Rankine (1994)
Average leverage effect 2.19 1.08 1.80
Average cross-ﬁrm variation
coefﬁcient of leverage effect
0.76 0.24 0.57
Share of ﬁrms with leverage
effect b1
17% 24% 13%
Lowest value of leverage effect 0.66 0.86 0.40
Highest value of leverage
effect
9.37 2.12 6.78
Ratio of highest to lowest
value of leverage effect
14.20 2.47 16.95
Percentage difference between
average CARSHV and average
CAROB
CARSHV is 13.27% higher than CAROB CAROB is 12.12% lower than CARSHV CARSHV and CAROB differ in sign
Correlation between CAROB
and leverage effect
−0.27 0.14 0.15
Substantive insight Insigniﬁcant effect turns into signiﬁcant
effect (second step of event study)
Signiﬁcant effect turns into insigniﬁcant
effect (second step of event study)
CAR remains insigniﬁcant but differs
in sign (ﬁrst step of event study)
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the problem at hand.
The choice of the dependent variable is particularly important when comparing marketing performance across ﬁrms. As shown
in our numerical example and the reanalysis of prior event studies, results obtained in cross-sectional studies using CAROB instead
of CARSHV are likely to differ. The reason is that ignoring the differences in ﬁrm-speciﬁc leverage effects inﬂates the impact of ob-
servations pertaining to ﬁrms with large debt and deﬂates those pertaining to ﬁrms with large non-operating assets. Such biases
can inﬂuence a study's conclusions regarding the size of the impact of a marketing-related event and, even worse, can provide
misleading evidence regarding the sign of the impact: value-creating events can easily be classiﬁed as value-destroying events
and vice versa.Appendix A. Size of variation of leverage effect
In this Appendix, we analyze the differences in ﬁrms' leverage effects to show how ignoring these leverage effects inﬂuences
the weights of ﬁrms' observations in the calculation of average values of CARSHV. As event studies usually use multiple observa-
tions per ﬁrm that are then compared among ﬁrms, we analyze (i) the within-ﬁrm variation of the leverage effect over time,
and (ii) the variation of the leverage effect across ﬁrms. Kindly note that this analysis differs from Schulze et al.'s (2012) study
in so far as we use a larger sample and focus on the variation of the leverage effect instead of its average size.
We use Compustat data to analyze ﬁrms listed in the S&P Total Market Index. Our unbalanced panel comprises 62,012 ﬁrm-
year observations of 4903 ﬁrms from 17 years (1998 to 2014). We follow Eq. (2) and calculate the leverage effect as shareholder
value (Compustat Data Item (CDI): prcc_f × csho (i.e., share price × common shares outstanding)) minus non-operating assetsFig. 3. Histograms of within-ﬁrm and cross-ﬁrm variations of leverage effects. a) Histogram of Within-ﬁrm Variations of Leverage Effects over Time. Average value
of variation coefﬁcient: 0.25, SD of variation coefﬁcient: 0.28, N = 4,461 ﬁrms (442 ﬁrms were dropped because only 1 year of data was available). b) Histogram of
Cross-Firm Variations of Leverage Effects (1998–2014). Average value of variation coefﬁcient: 1.21, SD of variation coefﬁcient: 0.55, N = 17 years.
658 B. Skiera et al. / International Journal of Research in Marketing 34 (2017) 641–659(CDI: ivst (i.e., short-term investments)) plus total debt (CDI: dd1 + dltt + pstk (i.e., long-term debt due in one year + long-term
debt + preferred stock)), divided by shareholder value (see Schulze et al., 2012).
We ﬁnd that the average leverage effect across ﬁrms and across years is 1.54 with a standard deviation of 1.90. We ﬁt the le-
verage effects of the 4903 ﬁrms (1998–2014) to various distributions (e.g., Log-Normal, Log-Logistic, Logistic, inverse Gaussian,
Gamma, Normal) and ﬁnd that a Log-Logistic distribution (scale parameter = 4.41, shape parameter = 1.22) best ﬁts the empir-
ical data (ﬁt was measured using the Akaike Information Criterion).
Fig. 3a here provides a histogram of the 4903 within-ﬁrm variations of the leverage effect over time. We measured variation
using the coefﬁcient of variation, which is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. The average value of the variation co-
efﬁcient is 0.25 (SD = 0.28). Fig. 3b provides a histogram of the variations of the leverage effects across ﬁrms for the 17 years. The
average value of the variation coefﬁcient is 1.21 (SD = 0.55) and is much larger than the value of the variation coefﬁcient obtain-
ed in the within-ﬁrm analysis (0.25). This ﬁnding indicates that when carrying out an event study to examine an event that solely
impacts ﬁrms' operating businesses, ignoring leverage effects is less problematic in within-ﬁrm analysis than in cross-ﬁrm analysis.
In the cross-ﬁrm analysis, the average values for the lowest and highest ventiles (top 5% and bottom 5%) in 2014 were, respec-
tively, 0.84 and 2.67. Thus, for an event that has an effect of +1% on the value of the operating business, CARSHV would be 2.67%
for a highly leveraged ﬁrm, whereas CARSHV would be 0.84% for an unleveraged ﬁrm. Hence, CARSHV of the highly leveraged ﬁrm is
more than three times larger than the CARSHV of the unleveraged ﬁrm, which means that the CARSHV value corresponding to the
highly leveraged ﬁrm receives more than three times higher weight in the calculation of the average CARSHV.References
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